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Introduction
Funding organisations controlled by Indigenous Australians and dedicated 
to serving them, in the name of ‘self-determination’, has created risks both 
for governments (who must satisfy the public that ‘taxpayers’ money’ is 
being well spent) and Indigenous leaders (who must not only meet service 
expectations of Indigenous Australians but also acquit funding according 
to government criteria). This chapter compares two experiments in 
governance: the Indigenous sector (thousands of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander corporations) and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC).
Australian governments have encouraged Indigenous Australians to form 
corporations in order to hold title to Indigenous property, advocate, deliver 
services and manage employment programs. The federal (conservative, 
led by Malcolm Fraser) government passed the Aboriginal Councils 
and Associations Act 1976 (henceforth ACA Act) in 1976. The Howard 
(conservative) Government replaced the ACA Act in 2007 with the 
Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (henceforth 
CATSI Act). Both Acts authorised the Registrar of Aboriginal/Indigenous 
Corporations to report publicly on Indigenous corporations’ financial 
accountability and organisational integrity. At the same time, Australian 
governments created national, elected Indigenous representative 
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organisations: the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC, 
1973–76), the National Aboriginal Conference (NAC, 1977–85) and the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC, 1989–2005).
ATSIC, unlike its predecessors, administered programs – mostly 
infrastructure, housing and employment, but not health, education 
and security programs. Under the Howard Government (1996–2007), 
the increasing political embarrassment of ATSIC led to a 2002–03 
review and then ATSIC’s abolition in 2004–05. Critical attention to the 
Indigenous sector took the form of amendments of the ACA Act in 1992, 
reviews of the Act in 1996–97 and 2001–04 and new legislation (the 
CATSI Act) in 2005–06. Why was one experiment in the delegation of 
public expenditure to Indigenous Australians (ATSIC) terminated while 
the funding of Indigenous organisations has continued as a permanent 
adaptation of Australian government to Indigenous political mobilisation? 
Expectations of the ACA Act
Although some Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people had formalised 
their collective action before the 1960s (sometimes in the context of 
long-lasting missions), we begin our story in 1970 with Charles Rowley’s 
suggestion that the Aboriginal ‘group’ would no longer be treated by 
governments as a ‘disappearing liability’ (as assimilation policy tended to 
assume), but as ‘an asset, to be endowed, by its own efforts, with enduring 
legal personality’.
The ‘fringe group’ was ‘the raw material for a corporation in perpetuity’.1 
When Prime Minister McMahon spoke on Aboriginal policy in January 
1972, he promised to investigate ‘a simple flexible form of incorporation 
for Aboriginal communities’.2 Justice Woodward’s advice to the Whitlam 
Government on land rights in 1973 included recommending that an 
incorporation statute be easy to understand, flexible enough to meet 
the needs of a variety of situations in which Aboriginal people would 
find themselves, not liable for taxation of its income, open to Aboriginal 
customs of decision-making and open to government intervention 
‘if things go wrong … through corruption, inefficiency, outside influences 
or for other reasons’.3 
1  Rowley, ‘Outcasts’, 425.
2  McMahon, Australian, 12.
3  Woodward, Aboriginal, para. 332, p. 65.
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Barrie Dexter, Secretary of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs from 
1973, recalled in 2015 that Aboriginal-controlled incorporated bodies were 
‘crucial to so much we were trying to do’.4 However, as they came under 
scrutiny, ‘Parliament and the community at large seemed to have become 
more interested in correct, detailed accounting than in the outcome of 
programs’, making the Department of Aboriginal Affairs ‘more reluctant 
to fund Aboriginal groups and let them learn by making mistakes, since 
we would certainly be further roasted by Parliament and our critics for 
any failures’.5 An incorporation statute designed to empower Indigenous 
Australians would also have to be a means of accountability and tuition.
Introducing a Bill for Aboriginal Councils and Associations in September 
1975, the minister for Aboriginal affairs (Lesley Johnson) linked it to land 
rights in the Northern Territory; the Act was to provide ‘a method of 
incorporation that would safeguard Aboriginal tenure of land’. He went 
on to list ways that the Act would also enable collective action not related 
to land tenure: receiving grants, holding and disposing of real and personal 
property, contracting, operating enterprises, and ‘generally to conduct 
their affairs in an orderly manner’ so that Indigenous Australians could 
fulfil their ‘obligation to acknowledge responsibility for the consequences 
of their actions’. The Act would be especially helpful to ‘remote, tradition-
oriented communities where the understanding of Western European 
legal concepts is very limited’; for such people, Johnson believed, the 
existing corporations laws were not helpful.6 Speaking in support, 
Manfred Cross remarked that ‘Aborigines do not have the sophistication 
and business experience to comply with many of the complex and 
technical requirements of State laws’.7 In establishing the Registrar 
of Aboriginal Corporations, the government intended to ‘advise and assist 
Aboriginal corporations and to supervise their activities in much the same 
way as a Registrar of Companies supervises the affairs of companies’.8 
Johnson’s bill lapsed when parliament dissolved in November 1975, but 
the Fraser Government saw the ACA Act through the parliament in 1976.
4  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 336.
5  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 336.
6  Johnson, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives (CPD HoR), 30 
September 1975, 1410.
7  Cross, CPD HoR, 4 November 1975, 2762.
8  Johnson, CPD HoR, 30 September 1975, 1410–11.
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We note several themes in the justification of the ACA Act: to acknowledge 
overlooked Indigenous political capacity by giving it a formal vehicle, 
to acknowledge cultural difference in Indigenous ways of associating, to 
bring order and transparency to group life, to make Aboriginal collective 
actions legally and fiscally accountable, and to spare Aboriginal people the 
burden of understanding complex legislation. 
An emerging sense of political risk
Incorporation was not only a means to Indigenous political development, 
it also became a resource for political elites (Indigenous and non-
Indigenous) to manage a new political risk that arose partly from different 
views about what Australia owed Indigenous Australians. For some 
Aboriginal people in the 1970s, as Johanna Perheentupa has shown in 
her chapter, government grants were compensation for dispossession and 
ill-treatment, so that Aboriginal people were not accountable to anyone 
but themselves in their spending of such funds. This view persisted among 
many Aboriginal people. In 1981, the NAC – the Fraser Government’s 
representative, elected assembly – called for the compensatory payment 
of 5 per cent of Australia’s gross national product to Aboriginal people to 
meet Aboriginal needs.9 Such claims were sympathetically acknowledged 
in 1991 in the National Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody:
What, to non-Aboriginal people, is a citizens’ right (which is 
subject to assessment, monitoring and may be taken away if the 
citizen fails to meet administrative and other criteria) should be 
available for them on a basis rather like that which might apply 
if compensation payments were made for past injustices. Given 
that sense of injustice, many Aboriginal people regard it as an 
added insult that payments made, either directly or through 
Aboriginal organizations, to meet basic needs should be subjected 
to the minute and suspicious scrutiny which accompanies such 
payments. At this level, Aboriginal people would see the whole 
process of delivery of such services as being one of further control 
of their lives and not one which offers autonomy.10 
9  ‘Aborigines Want Land, Self-Rule’, West Australian, 23 September 1981.
10  Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC), National Report, vol. 2, 
525–26.
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The national commissioner’s impression was that Indigenous Australians 
‘have accepted the concept of representation through organizations’, and 
he predicted that they would come to trust their organisations more, 
allowing their leaders more scope for decision-making.11 For trust to 
develop, he advised, governments would have to moderate or cease their 
close inspection of organisations’ use of public money.
By then, the minister for Aboriginal affairs had initiated discussion of 
the Act, circulating a review paper in February 1990.12 There were 1,024 
corporations registered under the ACA Act and supported by government 
grants. The registrar proposed amendments to the ACA, resulting in the 
Keating Government’s Aboriginal Councils and Associations Amendment 
Act 1992. The changes were intended to strengthen the rights of ordinary 
members and to improve public accountability. Governing committees 
could no longer include bankrupts or certain categories of persons 
sentenced to imprisonment; members of governing committees would 
disclose financial interest in matters before the committee; the registrar 
would arbitrate internal disputes and enforce dissenting members’ right 
to request that governing committees convene a special meeting; the 
registrar could now issue statutory notices, seek injunctions, appoint 
administrators and petition for a corporation’s wind-up. In June 1993, 
the Keating Government tabled further amendments that would have 
increased state discipline.13 
These changes addressed perceptions that Aboriginal corporations might 
use grants improperly if not more closely monitored. Adding to the 
perception that public money was at risk, there was now another layer 
of Indigenous control over money, as ATSIC assumed responsibility 
for programs that had been administered from 1973 to 1990 by the 
Department  of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA). While ATSIC officials, like 
DAA officials, were Commonwealth public servants, ATSIC policies 
were set by  elected Indigenous Australians. The Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander electorate voted in regions (at first 60, but reduced to 36 
in 1993) to select regional councillors, and regional councils formulated 
development plans. To select ATSIC’s national leadership, regional 
councillors were grouped into 17 electoral zones, each zone electing 
one commissioner. The  government appointed three commissioners 
11  RCIADIC, National Report, vol. 2, 525–26.
12  Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations (ORAC), Annual Report 1989–90.
13  Mantziaris, ‘Beyond’.
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(including  the chair), to make a board of 20. Regional Councils 
had discretion over grants  to Indigenous organisations delivering 
housing, infrastructure and employment, subject to policies set by the 
commissioners. ATSIC was thus a hybrid of two previously distinct kinds 
of agency: program delivery (formerly DAA’s responsibility) and the 
work of political representation and policy advice previously carried out 
by the NAC and its predecessor the NACC.
Debating the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 
1989, conservative members of parliament had doubted that an agency 
controlled by elected Indigenous Australians would handle public money 
responsibly. The shadow minister for Aboriginal affairs (Warwick Smith) 
criticised ATSIC as excessively centralised, adding:
This integration of representative and administrative functions 
[would leave the commissioners] torn between doing the best 
for their constituents and administering hundreds of millions 
of dollars for grants with bureaucratic impartiality. That is 
a fundamental conflict, a conflict in which lie the seeds of ATSIC’s 
destruction.14
Conservative misgivings about ATSIC went even deeper than this. 
The  very idea of a distinct Indigenous institution seemed wrong in 
principle to John Howard. On 11 April 1989, before the bill’s ‘first 
reading’, he warned that:
If the Government wants to divide Australian against Australian, 
if it wants to create a black nation within the Australian nation, 
it should go ahead with its Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC) legislation and its treaty.15
The Hawke Government did not yield to Howard’s point, but it did 
address the worry that elected persons might use public money to 
ingratiate  Indigenous constituents. The Act prescribed an Office of 
Evaluation and Audit (OEA) within ATSIC. The intended functions 
of the OEA paralleled those of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations.
14  Smith, CPD HoR, 23 May 1989, 2714.
15  Howard, CPD HoR, 11 April 1989, 1328.
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The registrar becomes active
Though not obliged to issue annual reports, the Registrar of Aboriginal 
Corporations began to do so in 1989–90, ATSIC’s first financial year, 
listing corporations subject to the new regime of ‘enforcement’ enabled 
by the 1992 amendments to the ACA Act. Registrar Nourredine Bouhafs 
(appointed in January 1993, after two periods ‘acting’ in 1991 and 1992) 
justified his powers:
When the Act was originally drafted in the 1970s, the emphasis 
was on keeping the incorporation process simple, allowing for 
the flexible operation of Aboriginal Corporations and keeping 
the ongoing reporting requirements to a minimum. The Act was 
particularly oriented towards the needs of remote communities 
receiving one-off grants for special purposes. Legislators at 
the time could not have foreseen the size and range of funding 
now flowing to Aboriginal Corporations, the complex business 
activities in which many are now involved and the considerable 
assets accumulated by Corporations over the past 16 years.16 
Bouhafs advised further amendments to the ACA Act, finding the 
Keating Government receptive. When ATSIC was asked to comment in 
1994, the commissioners persuaded the minister to defer amendments, 
pending a review of the ACA Act to be conducted by ATSIC. The review 
(by  Dr  James Fingleton for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Studies) recommended relaxation of restrictions 
on the design of Indigenous corporations, to align them better with 
Indigenous custom.17 Fingleton’s 1996 recommendations did not persuade 
the Howard Government to change the ACA Act.
While Fingleton was conducting his review, the election of the Howard 
Government in March 1996 brought to power members of parliament 
still sceptical about whether Indigenous people other than public servants 
should be spending public money. Publicised instances of dishonesty 
and/or incompetence illustrated for many Australians that public money 
allocated to elected Indigenous Australians could bankroll political 
patronage by an emerging Indigenous political class. Accordingly, there 
was an audience for Bouhafs’s continuing reports. Enforcement statistics 
for July 1994 to June 2000 (the period in which Bouhafs was Registrar) 
are shown in Table 6.1:
16  ORAC, Annual Report 1993–94, vii.
17  See Rowse, ‘Culturally’ for a discussion of the Fingleton Report.
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Table 6.1: Acquittal lapses and corrective actions, ORAC, 1994–95 to 
1999–2000.
Year 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000
Administrators
appointed 



















48 30 22 44 14 32
Subject to 
winding up




2,389 2,654 2,816 2,999 2,853 2,703
Source: oRAC, Annual Reports 1994–95, 1995–96, 1996–97, 1997–98, 1998–99, 
1999–2000 .
Examinations enabled the registrar to provide ‘feedback’, usually in the 
form of a letter detailing a list of required improvements. Corporations 
in serious trouble were sent a formal notice requiring them to ‘show 
cause’ why ORAC (Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations) 
should not appoint a ‘special administrator’ to take temporary control of 
the corporation. Administration did not usually include liquidating the 
corporation’s assets, negotiating a plan to pay its debts and winding it up. 
More often, ‘administration’ sought to enable an Indigenous corporation 
to continue on a more sustainable financial footing, so that the surviving 
Indigenous corporation could be handed back to its directors.
The registrar continued to press for reform, noting significant changes 
in the Act’s environment in the 1990s: Australian lawmakers at the state 
and the national levels had been forced by a High Court ruling in 1990 
to engage in a major reconstruction of corporate regulation, resulting 
in the Corporations Act 2001; and the implementation of the Native 
Title Act 1993 was giving rise to many prescribed bodies corporate, as 
title-holding entities. In November 2000, the registrar commissioned 
a review of the ACA Act by a multidisciplinary team headed by Corrs 
Chambers Westgarth, Lawyers. The review’s consultation paper asked 
whether a  specific Indigenous incorporation statute was still necessary, 
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and (if so) whether it should be for all Indigenous corporations, regardless 
of size. Consultations found widespread support for such a statute with 
no restriction on the size of the organisations to which it would apply; 
as well, according to the registrar, supporters wanted the Act to be both 
‘more flexible’ about the design of corporations and more consistent with 
the Corporations Act, while enabling the registrar’s office to focus more on 
‘capacity building and assistance’.18 The final report and recommendations 
of the Corrs review were released in December 2002. Before we describe 
the legislation that flowed from the report, it is necessary to note what was 
happening to ATSIC.
ATSIC’s demise, 2002–05
From the inception of ATSIC, its leaders had faced a problem of 
legitimacy in the eyes of Indigenous Australians, as the first appointed 
chair of ATSIC, Lowitja O’Donoghue, acknowledged in 1995:
Certain Indigenous organisations have also been critical of ATSIC’s 
role and representativeness. They have challenged its decisions 
or sponsored challenges in public debate, in courts or tribunals 
or through the Ombudsman. To a great extent these challenges 
should not be regarded as surprising or necessarily reflecting on 
ATSIC’s competence. It is only natural that other organisations 
may have agendas that differ from the Commission’s. It should 
not be assumed that indigenous Australia will always speak with 
one voice. But ATSIC as the only national structure of indigenous 
representation will endure. Above all, ATSIC represents a challenge 
for Indigenous Australians, a challenge to get involved, to make 
processes work for them.19 
On assuming office, the Howard Government modified but did not 
extinguish the Hawke government’s and Keating government’s defining 
Indigenous policies: ATSIC and native title. In April 1996, the Howard 
Government appointed a special auditor to ATSIC. Before grants or 
loans to organisations could be made, a clearance from the special auditor 
would be required. ATSIC disputed the legality of this innovation and the 
Federal Court ruled that the government was not empowered to direct 
the commission in this way. By the time this judgement was announced, 
18  ORAC, Annual Report 2001–02, 3.
19  ATSIC, Annual Report 1994–95, 34.
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the special auditor had already examined 1,122 organisations, clearing 
95 per cent of them for further funding. ATSIC was pleased to report the 
opinion of the special auditor that many accountability problems related 
not to dishonesty but to the small size of the organisations and to their 
lack of training.20 In its first budget (1996–97), the Howard Government 
reduced ATSIC’s funding by 6 per cent.
Constrained by the new national ideology of ‘reconciliation’ (which 
Howard described as ‘an unstoppable force’), the Howard Government 
seemed cautiously to explore what legacies of Labor to reject and what 
to ‘live with’, pragmatically.21 Affording ATSIC greater autonomy, the 
government in 1999 allowed that the chair of ATSIC be elected by the 
Board of Commissioners. In December 1999, the board elected Geoff 
Clark, whose commitment to Indigenous rights made him one of many 
critics of the Howard Government’s 1998 amendments to the Native 
Title Act. Howard and Clark were thus on opposite sides of a 1990s 
debate about whether recognising distinct Indigenous rights was essential 
for reconciliation.22 While both agreed that ‘reconciliation’ included 
reducing Indigenous Australians’ socio-economic ‘disadvantage’, ATSIC 
(and Clark) argued that the key to overcoming disadvantage was greater 
government recognition of Indigenous Australians as self-determining 
peoples within the Australian nation. The Howard Government dismissed 
distinct Indigenous rights as a distraction from the interests of Indigenous 
Australians: the ‘practical reconciliation’ that would result from 
government programs in housing, health, education, security services, 
employment and Indigenous enterprise formation.
Clark, like O’Donoghue, sensed that ATSIC was politically vulnerable. 
At ATSIC’s policy conference in April 2002 he reminded his audience 
that, even though ATSIC spent less than half of the Commonwealth’s 
Indigenous program budget, it was conspicuous (to the public) as the 
paramount Indigenous agency, and easily blamed for not achieving socio-
economic equality (‘practical reconciliation’).23 Exacerbating ATSIC’s 
problem were the diminishing reputations of Clark and his Deputy 
Chair Ray Robinson. In July 2002, police in Victoria decided not to 
prosecute Clark for rape, after 12 months of investigating well-publicised 
20  ATSIC, Annual Report 1996–97, 25.
21  Howard, Howard, 252.
22  For a content analysis of federal MPs’ uses of the ‘reconciliation’ see Pratt, Practising.
23  ‘Systemic Ignorance over ATSIC Budget: Clark’, National Indigenous Times, 22 May 2002, 9.
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accusations. He was also being prosecuted for ‘riotous behaviour’ after 
a fight in a hotel. Some observers questioned the political judgement of 
ATSIC’s Board of Commissioners for covering the costs of his defence 
by a top Melbourne QC. In Queensland, Ray Robinson began legal 
proceedings against the Courier Mail for alleging his improper financial 
dealing, while the Office of Evaluation and Audit investigated the claim.24
Without referring to these problems of individual standing, in June 2002 
the minister (Philip Ruddock) announced a review of ATSIC. He justified 
the inquiry as a response to Indigenous disquiet, quoting Marandoo 
Yanner describing ATSIC as a ‘hopeless, powerless, useless organisation’. 
While that was harsh, the minister commented, it ‘speaks of the sort of 
frustrations that are there’.25 Two weeks later, the National Indigenous Times 
reported a young Aboriginal man, Joe Hedger, saying that ATSIC was in 
the newspapers ‘for the wrong reasons’ and that young people such as 
himself were not attracted to it for a political career.26 In July 2002, Clark 
acknowledged that some Indigenous Australians were so alienated from 
ATSIC that they might not participate in its fourth election (scheduled 
to be held on 19 October 2002). Voter registration, he acknowledged, 
was a test of ATSIC’s significance to Indigenous Australians.27 Clark and 
John Ah Kit (an Indigenous member of the Northern Territory Legislative 
Assembly) were quoted as saying that, while they respected the choice 
not to vote, Indigenous Australians should vote.28 The October election 
produced a new board and, in December, Clark and Robinson persuaded 
commissioners that they should continue as chair and deputy chair.
Criticism of ATSIC came from Indigenous people whom the minister 
could not ignore. At the time of the election, Patrick Dodson (former 
chair of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation) was reported as calling 
for ATSIC to be phased out; ATSIC was tarnished, he reportedly said, by 
24  Chris Graham, ‘ATSIC Launches Inquiry; Robinson Claims Innocence’, National Indigenous 
Times, 31 July 2002, 1, 4.
25  Chris Graham, ‘Ruddock Calls for Debate on ATSIC’s Future’, National Indigenous Times, 5 June 
2002, 1, 4.
26  Chris Graham, ‘A Fiery Political Welcome for Young “Warrior”’, National Indigenous Times, 
19 June 2002, 1, 9.
27  Chris Graham, ‘ATSIC Enters Election Mode’, National Indigenous Times, 31 July 2002, 1, 17.
28  Chris Graham, ‘To Vote or Not to Vote? That Was the Question’, National Indigenous Times, 
9 October 2002, 1, 4. Table 8 in Sanders, Taylor and Ross, ‘Participation’, 508 shows that voter turn-
out, as a proportion of voting age Indigenous population, was 23.7 per cent in 1993, 24.1 per cent in 
1996 and 22.9 per cent in 1999. 
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the actions of its leaders.29 At the same time, newspapers reported a court 
case in which Clark’s predecessor as chair, Gatjil Djerrkura, was accused of 
sexual harassment. Commissioner Jenny Pryor was quoted as saying that 
a woman should lead ATSIC, given the behaviour of its male leaders.30 
In November 2002, Minister Ruddock announced rules that would allow 
him to remove a commissioner ‘for a variety of behavioural offences, 
including causing public embarrassment to an Aboriginal organisation, 
seriously disrupting meetings and sexual harassment in or out of the 
workplace’.31 In December the new CEO of ATSIC, Wayne Gibbons, 
was quoted as saying that:
A lot of what you hear about ATSIC is not too favourable. There’s 
a perception of poor administration and of waste. That’s got to be 
dealt with or ATSIC does not have a future.32 
Lowitja O’Donoghue wrote to Ruddock asking him to state his reasons 
for not sacking Clark.33 
Meanwhile, on 12 November 2002, the minister had announced the 
ATSIC inquiry’s terms of reference and the panel that would conduct 
the  review: Bob Collins, John Hannaford and Jackie Huggins. Within 
weeks, he had pre-empted their recommendations in one respect. 
In order  to deal with perceptions of conflict of interest, he announced 
on Christmas Eve 2002 that ATSIC could no longer fund organisations of 
which ATSIC full-time officeholders were directors or in which they had 
a controlling interest.34 The review recommendations were further pre-
empted, in April–June 2003, by a ministerial command that radically 
redesigned ATSIC: removing nearly all staff and almost the entire budget 
from the control of the Board of Commissioners and handing them over 
to a new body, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services (ATSIS). 
ATSIS was to be made up of former ATSIC public servants, answerable 
to the minister and making all decisions about individual grants (within 
policy guidelines formulated by ATSIC’s Board of Commissioners). 
Debating this change in April 2003, Ruddock and Clark had been unable 
29  Chris Graham and AAP, ‘Dodson Comments Sour Grapes: Sugar’, National Indigenous Times, 
23 October 2002, 1.
30  ‘Pryor Says ATSIC Needs a Woman at the Helm’, National Indigenous Times, 23 October 2002, 10.
31  Chris Graham, ‘Tough New Rules for ATSIC Board’, National Indigenous Times, 20 November 
2002, 1, 11.
32  Chris Graham, ‘ATSIC Needs an Overhaul: CEO’, National Indigenous Times, 18 December 2002.
33  ‘ATSIC under Fire’, National Indigenous Times, 30 April 2003, 4.
34  ATSIC, Annual Report 2002–03.
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to agree on a model that would deal – to the government’s satisfaction – 
with perceptions that persons elected to ATSIC had a conflict of interest 
if they participated in grant decisions.35 In the formation of ATSIS, the 
minister had asserted his authority – ‘a gun pointed at our head’, as Clark 
later described it.36 ATSIS commenced on 1 July 2003.
The Howard Government received the report of the ATSIC review in 
November 2003. Explaining Indigenous Australians’ estrangement as 
an effect of ATSIC’s concentration of power at the national level, the 
panel sought more power for elected regional councils. At the national 
level, the Board of Commissioners should be split into a deliberative, 
policymaking body of 38 that would delegate day-to-day leadership to 
a ‘national executive’ of up to 10 members, serviced by policy committees. 
Seeking to reduce expectations of ATSIC, the review pointed to the small 
role assigned to ATSIC in relieving Indigenous Australians’ immense 
problems. Finally, the panel suggested that the elected and administrative 
arms (ATSIC and ATSIS) be reintegrated, but with a clearer delineation 
of their roles.37 
The federal Opposition (the Australian Labor Party) contributed to the 
debate about these reforms by announcing on 30 March 2004 that it would 
abolish ATSIC if it won the 2004 election and replace it with a directly 
elected national Indigenous body. This emboldened the government 
to announce (on 15 April 2004) that it would abolish ATSIC, appoint 
a National Indigenous Council (NIC), devolve Indigenous-specific 
programs to mainstream departments, establish forums (Ministerial 
Taskforce, Secretaries Group, Indigenous Coordinating Centres) 
for intergovernmental and cross-agency cooperation, and negotiate 
agreements on service delivery with communities. Invoking their right to 
self-determination, around 200 Indigenous leaders gathered in Adelaide 
from 11 to 14 June to call for a new national Indigenous representative 
body, though they did not specify how representatives should be chosen. 
The Howard Government’s response in November 2004 was to appoint 
a small, advisory NIC. Chaired by Aboriginal magistrate Sue Gordon, the 
NIC was not a representative but an ‘expert’ body, advising the Ministerial 
Taskforce on Indigenous affairs. 
35  Chris Graham, ‘A Painful Separation for ATSIC’, National Indigenous Times, 16 April 2003, 6.
36  Brian Johnstone interview with Geoff Clark, ‘An Assault on Me Is an Assault on Us All: Clark’, 
National Indigenous Times, 23 July 2003, 7.
37  Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Report.
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What caused ATSIC’s downfall? Perhaps ATSIC demonstrated the 
limits of Australian governments’ commitment to self-determination. 
Australian governments could have funded ATSIC more generously, 
broadened its program responsibilities and secured its seat in the higher 
forums of federated government so that it could call other federal and 
state/territory agencies to account. Against that view, we note that it 
was in response to Indigenous criticism (by Aboriginal community-
controlled health services)  that the Keating Government had removed 
health program funding from  ATSIC (in which regional councils had 
much say about money for health programs) to the Commonwealth 
Department of Human Services and Health in July 1995. Another 
explanation of ATSIC’s demise was that its inception was ‘a classic pre-
emption of Aboriginal choice’ – that is, a national institution imposed on 
a political culture in which affiliations are local and in which mobilisation 
is necessarily episodic.38 Yet another explanation is to point to cynicism 
(the venality and naivety of certain individuals who had been empowered 
by national structures) and naivety (unrealistic expectations by Indigenous 
voters about what ATSIC’s programs could achieve and how quickly). 
A fourth explanation points to genuine philosophical differences about 
what it means to represent and serve ‘your mob’, with resulting unclarity 
of norms about ethical dealing (‘conflicts of interest’). Here we note the 
novelty – within Australia’s settler colonial political culture – of the very 
idea of Indigenous rights in governance. Whereas Indigenous property 
rights have been relatively easy to encode in legislation (though never 
without controversy), it has not been so clear how ‘Indigenous rights’ 
in governance should be operationalised. As well, the norms relevant to 
government funding (compensation or ‘taxpayers’ money’?) have been 
contested. The dispute about what counted as a ‘conflict of interest’ in 
ATSIC’s processes had little to do with the criminality (real or alleged) 
of this or that individual and more to do with unresolved issues of 
jurisdiction and political culture. 
38  Wootten, ‘Self-determination’, 17–18.
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The CATSI Act39
According to the 2002 Corrs review, the rationale for an Indigenous-specific 
incorporation statute was that most Indigenous corporations had social 
rather than commercial objectives. The review sought to recognise greater 
diversity among those social purposes, acknowledging the possibility of 
different constitutions and reporting requirements, and it recommended 
that the registrar have discretion to modify the latter.40 Meanwhile, the 
responsibilities of directors and officers could more closely align with 
the Corporations Act 2001. The Howard Government’s legislation largely 
followed these recommendations, and members of parliament from 
Labor and the Coalition had few differences to debate. Some Opposition 
speakers recalled that the Fingleton review had criticised the ACA Act for 
being too prescriptive of the internal structure of registered corporations. 
While they welcomed the new legislation’s expanded options, they 
called for vigilance, so that actual Indigenous control did not slip away: 
improved  corporate practices, they warned, should not be effected by 
‘experts’ supplanting Indigenous people. Another reservation expressed 
by  Labor speakers was that the registrar should be obliged to obtain 
a court order before ordering appointment of an administrator.
The Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 is a special 
measure for the advancement and protection of Aboriginal peoples and 
Torres Strait Islanders under Paragraph 4 of Article 1 of the Convention for 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975. The Act sets out rules about membership, elected office-holding, 
meeting procedures and record-keeping; it specifies corporate obligations 
about the timing and content of reports to the Office of the Registrar 
of Indigenous Corporations (ORIC); it defines ORIC’s powers of 
enforcement and specifies offences; it demarcates the jurisdiction of courts 
as allies of the registrar in enforcement, enabling ORIC to prosecute. Thus 
empowered, ORIC has provided formal training in corporate governance 
to members and directors of Indigenous corporations and information 
and advice to members who have grievances about their corporation. 
In 2017–18 ORIC completed examinations of 53 corporations (out of 
39  In October 2006 parliament considered a package of bills: the Corporations Amendment 
(Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations) Bill 2006; the Corporations (Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander) Consequential, Transitional and Other Measures Bill 2006, the transitional 
bill; and the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2005, the amendment bill.
40  Corrs Chambers Westgarth et al., Modern Statute.
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3,046 registered corporations at 30 June 2018). On 5 July 2017 the 
Australian Government announced additional funding of $4 million over 
four years for ORIC (roughly a 12 per cent increase in ORIC’s budget, 
each year) for additional training, examinations and investigations.
The CATSI Act focuses on organisational soundness and financial 
transparency, but Indigenous organisations are also subject to program 
accountability to the government departments that fund them. 
Departments influenced by new public management have moved away 
from funding not-for-profits through block grants, instead contracting 
with not-for-profits for the delivery of services in accordance with precise 
program expectations. Many Indigenous corporations rely on income 
from programs administered by more than one department, making 
reporting complex and demanding advanced English literacy. Curchin’s 
interviews with corporations elicited concern about the time diverted from 
service delivery to reporting. In 2010, the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
Allan Asher warned that ‘promising Indigenous programs in rural and 
remote communities risk failure due to complex and onerous government 
reporting requirements’.41
The abolition of ATSIC also created problems insofar as mainstream 
departments that took over ATSIC’s programs were reluctant to continue 
funding small highly localised Indigenous organisations. They encouraged 
the formation of larger regional Indigenous organisations or made 
contracts for the delivery of Indigenous services with non-Indigenous 
organisations including international non-government organisations. 
In 2012, ORIC reported that the ‘move towards mainstreaming and 
regionalisation of service delivery for remote communities and away 
from funding for community organisations is affecting the solvency and 
long-term viability of many community-based Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander organisations’.42 ORIC was called on to assist in the 
restructuring and winding up of many organisations that had lost their 
most important funding stream.43 At times, government departments 
were clawing back control of assets that had originally been funded by 
government programs, assets that Indigenous people see as belonging to 
the Indigenous community.
41  Commonwealth Ombudsman, ‘Red Tape Causes Indigenous Programs to Fail’, Media Release, 
10 December 2010, www.ombudsman.gov.au/media-releases/media-release-documents/commonwealth-
ombudsman/2010/146.
42  ORIC, Yearbook 2011–12, 6.
43  ORIC, Yearbook 2011–12, 6.
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Conclusion
Indigenous organisations have been crucial to ‘self-determination’, and 
ATSIC and the Indigenous sector (made up of thousands of Indigenous 
corporations) have been experiments in governments’ funding of 
Indigenous Australians to administer services to other Indigenous 
Australians. Within 15 years (1990–2005), ATSIC acquired and lost 
political support for reasons both structural and contingent. If the 
Indigenous sector has proved comparatively robust, it is not only because 
the benefits of local service organisations have been more obvious to 
Indigenous Australians than the benefits of national representative 
institutions, but also because the Australian state has been tutelary 
and disciplinary, providing a statutory environment that facilitated the 
Indigenous sector in three ways: enabling the exit of organisations that 
fell into disuse or into irreparable dysfunction, encouraging the formation 
of new organisations (including many formed as prescribed bodies 
corporate pursuant to the Native Title Act), and submitting organisations 
to oversight and training in what Australian governments and many 
Indigenous Australians considered good governance. The ACA and 
CATSI Acts both enabled and constrained the autonomy of Indigenous 
collectives. While the regulatory regime that has evolved since 1976 still 
sees persisting Indigenous communality in a positive light, it demands 
good governance.44 Much of the CATSI Act mirrors the Corporations Act 
2001, so that directors of Indigenous corporations must meet expectations 
derived from Western corporation law. 
Among Indigenous leaders who see a governance gap that must be closed 
by encouraging Indigenous Australians to run corporations in better 
ways, we find Mick Dodson. In 2003, he and Diane Smith evoked an 
ethical culture that would result in profitable Indigenous enterprises 
44  The embrace by some Indigenous public figures of the concept of good governance followed 
recognition by international financial institutions in the 1990s that good governance promotes 
economic growth and hence that international development assistance should be made conditional 
on good governance. ‘What is Good Governance?’ United Nations Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific, 10 July 2009, www.unescap.org/resources/what-good-governance; ‘The IMF’s 
Approach to Promoting Good Governance and Combating Corruption – A Guide: Why Does the 
IMF Care So Much about Good Governance?’, International Monetary Fund, last updated 20 June 
2005, www.imf.org/external/np/gov/guide/eng/index.htm#care; World Bank, Governance and the 
Law, World Development Report 2017 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017), www.worldbank.org/ 
en/publication/wdr2017.
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and ‘political and business stability’.45 They proposed ‘a clear separation 
between the powers and responsibilities of leaders and boards, and the 
daily management of community businesses and services’.46 They listed 
core ingredients and principles of good governance, including respect 
for the ‘rules of the game’, such as those found in publications of the 
Australian Stock Exchange; commitment to procedures of appeal and 
dispute resolution; and ability to explain financial management systems 
to governing boards.47 They hoped that Indigenous organisations could 
grow in size without losing effectiveness – scaling up beyond the local.48 
Based on his empirical investigation of Aboriginal community councils, 
Limerick considered that the conventional Western-derived practices 
and principles of good governance ‘are not only relevant in the unique 
cultural context of Indigenous governance, but perhaps have even greater 
importance in this context’.49 In his view, Indigenous governance must 
be especially robust to survive members’ and directors’ family-oriented 
cultural values.
The Australian regime enacts protectionist and assimilationist policy 
logics. Sanders has noted the return of ‘protection’ and ‘guardianship’ 
to Indigenous affairs in the Howard era.50 Indeed, protectionist logic 
has been evident in the regulation of Indigenous corporations since the 
1970s. Indigenous collectives have been viewed as especially vulnerable, 
requiring a conscientious guardian (the registrar) against threats internal 
and external. However, Indigenous Australians are not unique in their 
subjection to protective and civilising powers, as we can see in the 
similarities of ORIC’s functions with those of the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC). Both ORIC and ASIC protect 
corporations’ creditors by preventing corporations from trading while 
insolvent, and both have the power to investigate and prosecute directors 
and senior officers of corporations. ORIC is far more tutelary, setting 
limits to acceptable customary difference; it can supervise problematic 
organisations more closely than ASIC, in what Sullivan calls the larger 
45  Dodson and Smith, ‘Governance’, 15, 20.
46  Dodson and Smith, ‘Governance’, 15.
47  Dodson and Smith, ‘Governance’, 14–17.
48  Dodson and Smith, ‘Governance’, 19.
49  Limerick, ‘What Makes’, 424.
50  Sanders, ‘Ideology’.
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‘attempt to normalize Aboriginal people by concentrating on Aboriginal 
deficit’.51 ASIC possesses no power equivalent to ORIC’s authority to 
examine Indigenous corporations’ books.
Do protection and assimilation, persistent in this regime, compromise 
self-determination? One of this chapter’s authors has argued that: 
Self-determination, no less than assimilation, implies 
Indigenous acculturation. Capacities are not culturally neutral. 
Self-determination affords new pressures and opportunities 
for Indigenous Australians to be more like non-Indigenous 
Australians, in many ways. This does not demand the surrender of 
Indigenous identity (quite the opposite), but it stimulates changes 
in Indigenous ways of reckoning their obligations to one another.52 
But what if the ‘Indigenous identity’ of a corporation includes norms 
and practices that amount to a ‘polity’, a colonised ‘jurisdiction’ not yet 
extinguished and demanding recognition? Indigenous political theorists, 
encouraged by ‘mounting evidence of Indigenous polities increasing their 
authority over their Country and citizens’, implicitly challenge Rowse’s 
view.53 They argue that, since the 1970s, Indigenous polities have adopted 
incorporation as a legal device to deal with the settler colonial state and civil 
society, an ‘accommodation to colonizer law’ that ‘can create confusion 
between the governance of Indigenous community organisations and 
the governance of Indigenous communities’. Indigenous collectives need 
‘to transition from “corporate governance” (management of community 
organisations) to “political governance” (governing of polities)’ a shift that 
‘might also be described as a transition from self-management to self-
determination’.54 Indigenous commentary on the CATSI Act is, therefore, 
ambivalent. Speaking at a forum convened by ORIC, Harold Furber 
complained of ‘the imposition of Western systems upon an existing 
governance process … I think ORIC is attempting to do it, and doing it 
to a certain extent well, but in the end what it is talking about is Western 
systems of governance and in the end it’s an imposition’.55
51  Sullivan, ‘Disenchantment’, 354.
52  Rowse, Indigenous, 231.
53  Vivian et al., ‘Indigenous’, 220. For an older (1996) Indigenous critique see Widders, ‘On the 
Dreaming’.
54  Vivian et al., ‘Indigenous’, 227.
55  Harold Furber speaking at an ORIC forum on Indigenous Corporate Governance in Alice 
Springs in 2010, Curchin field data.
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The Indigenous sector has enacted Rowley’s vision of (what Batty calls) 
‘linkages between the mechanisms of government and a collective 
Aboriginal subjectivity or agency’ such that Aboriginal people would 
‘incorporate the administrative procedures of government into their own 
sense of communal personhood’.56 Aboriginal ‘communal personhood’ has 
bent to fit the mechanisms of government, far more than the mechanisms 
of government have bent to fit with Aboriginal ‘communal personhood’.
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